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Abstract 
A number of tests used by linguists to distinguish a.mbtffiitf 
from lack of specification are described and illustrated, wi 1 
brief critical commentary. The tests appeal to semantic, syntactic, 
and pragmatic principles. Special attention is given to tests using 
transformations whose applicability depends upon identity of sense; 
these tests can help to decide the status of examples for which 
other tests give no evidence. But there is a class of cases where 
the identity.tests predict ambiguity, even though common sense (and 
tests not involving identity of sense) says that these cases involve 
special uses of sentences, not meaning proper, and other tests for 
ambiguity agree, These cases are characterized, and their anomalous 
behavior is explained on the grounds that they require suspension 
of the sincerity principle of conversation (that one means what one 
says). 
1, Background. 
The notion of ambiguity plays a fundamental role in syntactic 
argumentation. Indeed, much recent discussion turns on whether 
particular examples are or are not ambiguous, and if they nre, in
'-, . 
what way. The existence of a rule of neg-Transportation depends 
ultimately on whether sentences like 
(1) I don't think she's bald. 
are ambiguous (betveen a reading like that of Itts not the case that 
I think she's bald and one like that of I .think she's not bald) and 
the treatment of sentence types and speech acts involves a decision 
about how many readings examples like 
(2) Why don't you ask her for help? 
have (question and suggestion, in this case). The cases can be 
listed for pages~ phrasal conjunction, tough Movement, Psych Movement, 
sloppy identity, rererential opacity, and so on. In each case, 
the question is how many underlying (or semgntic) representations 
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66 i412), though n.,eut:ralit:y, ~a.:r;;kedness, 
The sentence 
should be assigned to ·a part,ieular example;-. if there are two or 
more, then transformational rul~s neutralizing these underlying
distinctions must be :posited. · ·· · 
The choice is between a.mbi~ui,. s~veral underlying syntactic 
(or semantic) representat'i.onsl oi-2i) and (2) and similar e:xamples,2 
and n single :representation corresponding to different states of 
affairs. 3 This second situatio:ti. .has been called {Quine 
1960:125-32), v ness (G. Lakoff 1970) and 
~ference {Wei 
snd lack q!,11ffi9±.fica.ti(?~ vould be equally good te:rms. 
(3) My sister is the Rwitanian Secretary of State. 
is unspe¢ified4 (general, indeftnite, unmarked, vague, neutral) 
with respect to whether fllY' sister is older or younger than I run, 
whether she acceded to her post recently or some time ago, whether 
the post is hers by birth or by merit, whether it ha.s an indefinite 
tenure or will cease at some specific future time, vhether she is 
:right~banded or left-handed, and so on, 
on the other hand, examples like 
(4) They s~w her duck.5  
{5) He cooked her goose.  
axe clearly ambiguous; they must be assigned two quite different 
semantic structures. Many other examples are not at all cle~ on 
~irst inspection. For these, linguists have developed a coll~ction 
of tests tha.t separate the clear cases of ambiguity from the clear 
cases o~ lack of specification, and so can be extended, tentatively 
at least, to the problematic exampies. Like ell grammatical tests 
(those for constituency~ category membership, and the like), these 
fail to apply in some situations, and they sometimes give unclear· 
answers. Nevertheless, their range of applicability is vi.de enough 
to make it worthwhile far us to give a list of the tests in common 
use by syntacticia.ns. 
Our aim bere6 is primarily descriptive of current practice, 
rather than prescriptive~ although we have tnken some ca.re to 
examine lines of argumentation critically. It should be noted that 
gra.mmatical tests in general, and ambiguity tests in particular, 
reflect the theory within vhich they a.re framed, so that we often 
find it appropriate to discuss the rationale behind particular tests 
(see especially sections 1.2.1~ 1,2.2, arid 1.3.3). Moreover, since 
the tests are not theory-neutral, they can be seen as giving insight 
into the central assumptions of tbe theories used by generative 
grammarians; oecaaionally, ns in section l.3.3, we consider meta-
theoretical issues arising from the connection between theory and test~ 
though such issues a.re not our in.a.in concern here. 
1.2. Semantic tests.7 
It will not do, of course, to argue that a sentence is ambiguous 
by characterizing the di~ference betveen two understandings.8 · 
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Sentence (3), for instance, isn 1 t many-ways a:m,biguous just because 
we can perceive many distinct classes pf contexts in which it 
would be· appropriate~ or bec~use we cti.n indicate many unders_tandings 
by paraphrases. A difference in understanding is a. necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition for nmbiguity. 
Nevertheless~ philosopher.s perenially argue for ambiguities 
on the basis of a difference in understanding elone, and eYen linguists 
are not immune. Thus, Zvicky 1969 maintains that 
(6) Melvin became as tall as any of his cousins. 
(7) Melvin beca'ne taller tha.n the average Ohioan. 
(8) Melvin became the tallest linguist in America. 
have tvo semantic representations each, one 1in which Melvin changes, 
one in which other circumstances change so that Melvin 1 s relative 
height changes' (293)--but without a.ny support beyond the articulation 
of this difference in understanding. 
In certain circumsta.ncest however, some evidence as to ambiguity 
or the lack of it ca.n be obtained from observations about semantics, 
The following subsections treat three such cases. 
1.2.1. A;epe~ls to semantic differentiae. 
Sentences--like (3)--that are unspecified with respect to some 
distinction have othen.ise quite similar understandings, so that the 
distinction in question must be the sort of thing that languages 
could plausibly fail to specify. Consequently, the burden of proof 
.falls on a.n:yone who insists that sentences like (4) and {5) are 
unspecified rather than ambiguous. Take (4). The distinction betveen 
the two understandings is tha.t between tvo understandings of the 
object phrase her duck--a certain sort o~ bird belonging to a woman 
and a certain kind of action performed by a woman. First, we know 
of no language in which there is a regular, formal indication of 
just the difference between t,he understandings of {l~). This argues 
either that we have either a lnck of specification or a.n unsystematic 
ambiguity. But, second, the two understandings of (!t) ha.ve little 
in common, so that a lack of specification is implausible. 
The first argument refers to the p~ibility:~y;stema.tic. 
a..'!lb:i.~: if a distinction in understanding is a systematic ambiguity 
in some language, then that distinction is potentially realizable 
by a formal mark in some other language:9 conversely, a distinction 
not formally realizable is either a syste:matic lack of specification 
or an unsystematic ambiguity. If languages don't formally mark the 
distinction between some sort of bird belonging to a woman and some 
sort of action performed by a voma.n, then this difrerence of under-
standing in any particular language {like English) is either a. 
systematic, that is general, failure to specify the difference between 
sorts of birds belonging to a voman and actions performed by a voman, 
or else it is en (unsystematic) ambiguity. 
The second argument refers to the plausibil~~Y=1?..f lack of 
spe~~!.!.~!~J~qp,: if some distinction in understanding is systematically 
wispecified in language, then it must be a simple distinction.10 
This argument is customarily used in a negative form, as above: 
distant:and complex semantic differentiae point to ambiguity rather 
than le.ck of specification.ll 
Note that from the facts that a particular sem.a.ntic differentia. 
is simple and that it is formally marked in some language, ,;.•e can 
conclude nothing about the status of this distinction for any 
particular example in any language; both lack of specification and 
systematic wnbiguity are consistent vith these facts. For instance, 
from the facts (a) that the older sister/younger sister understandings 
of (3) differ minimally, and {b) that there 8.l"e languages that mark 
this dirrerence formally (by different suffixes, or by a series of 
different lexical items, say}~ the strongest conclusion that can be 
drawn is that it is not implausible that the difference in under-
standing is an ambiguity; but these facts are consistent with both 
lack of speci£ieation and ambiguity. The fact that age differencest 
sex differences, specificity in noun phrases, inclusivity in plural 
pronouns, factivity in complement clauses~ and so on are formally 
marked in some languages tells us nothing about the status of pa.rticuler 
examples in English; ve ar~ not entitled to dismiss a claim of ambiguity 
out of hand, but the plausibility of the differentiae doesn't choose 
between ambiguity and lack of specification. 
This caveat about appeals to dif:ferentiae holds even w.ithin a 
language. Thanks to the fact that English distinguishes a set of 
lexical items that are masculine {E!!!:!!., boy, king, etc.) from 
corresponding items that are feminine(~, girl, gueen, etc.) 
and the fact that English pronominal reference systematically 
distinguishes between masculine and feminine, the differentia 
masculine/feminine plays a part in the semantic system of English. 
But from this we can conclude nothing about the status of lexical 
items like person,~' chairman, secreta.rz, ppg, or goose, all 
of which can be understood as either masculine or feminine; the 
existence or a systematic distinction elsewhere in English says only 
that a. claim of ambiguity. :for such items it not implausible, but it 
doesn't tell us whether any one of them is or is not a.mbiguous. 
It will be useful here to give some terms for two familiar types 
of distinction in understanding: polar opposites and privative 
opposites. Two understandings U1 and U2 are ~nosites with 
respect to some semantic feature F if they are identical except that
12U1 can be represented a.shaving +F where U2 has -F~ or the reverse.
Mother and father have understandings that are polar opposites vith 
respect to a gender feature. u1 and U2 are ~a.J,ive opposites1 3 
vi.th respect to F if U1 can be represented as being identical to U2 
except that U1 includes some specification for F which is lacking 
in U2. Parent and mother have understandings that a.re privative 
opposites Yith respect to a. gender feature; so do the technical 
teffl dog 1ma.le ca.nine t and the ordinary-le.ngua.ge term dog 'ca.nine' • 
note that polar opposites are contradictory-> while one privative 
opposite (the more specific understanding) implies the other (the 
more general understanding). As we shall see in later sections, 
the logic of privaUve opposites makes it difficult to distinguish 
ambiguity from 1ack of specification vhenever a privative opposition 
is in question. 
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1.2.2. Contra.diction. . 
One way of detecting a.n.~biguity between p:rivative opposites 
uses the fact that one se:r,na.ntic :repres.E!ntatJori is more specific than 
the other. Aaa. result, it shouid be possibl~ to assert the general 
while denying the specific, without co~tradiction. To see this, 
compare 
(9) That's a dog. 
vhich our intuiti.ons (a.nd al;t. standard dictionaries) would suggest 
is ambiguous, with 
{10} That's a lion. 
where we have no such intuitions {nor do dictionaries). Asserting 
the general while denying the specific gives us, respectively: 
(11) That's a dog, but it isn 1t a dog.llJ 
(12·) ?Tha.t•s a lion, but it isn•t n lion.1 5 
or~ in a simple sentence: 
(13} That dog isn't a dog.  
{14) ?That lion isn't a lion.  
Observe that (ll) and (13) are not contradictions, while (12) and 
(14) are; aiiditiona.l information brings this out: 
(15) That dog ian 't a dog; it t 5 a bitch. 
(16) ?That lion isn't.a lion; it's a lioness. 
Example (15) can be understood as asserting tha.t some a.nim.a.l is a 
canine but not a male canine, in fact that it is female. This 
possibility depends on dog having two semantic representations. (16), 
on the other hand, is a contradiction, which indicates that there is 
no vay to assert one understanding of (10) and deny another. Even 
supplying the specitic difference in understanding~ as in (16)! will 
not help, It is not, of course, necessary to give the appearance 
of paradox, as in {11)-(16) t to test for ambiguity by investigating 
contradiction. It is sufficient to assert the general understanding 
and supply material that implies the. denial of the specific under-
standing, as in 
(17) That isD't a dog; it's a bitch. 
(18) ?That isn't a lion; it's a lioness. 
or 
(19) That• s a bitch , not a dog. 
(20) ?That's a lionesst not a lion. 
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l.2. 3. Inconstancz. under s,ubst,itut ion, 
Other:things being equal';' synonyms, near-synonyms, and· (in 
general) selliimtfoaJ.ly related rexical items have similar privileges 
of occurrence. In English, must and have to, £,hrysa.nthemum and 
flower, bull and ~ ca.n be expected to occur in pretty much the 
same linguistic environments. lf there. is a.n environment in which 
only one of a·pair can occur, and if this diffetence in distribution 
can't be attributed either to such meaning differences as are present 
in the items or to simple exceptionaiity, then we should suspect 
that ~he environment includes an idiom involving one of the items. 
This test can be used to support arguments from implausible 
differentiae (as in section 1.2.1). Thus, we expect that (5) is 
ambiguous rather than unspecified, since the distinction between the 
preparation for eating of a fowl belonging to a woman, a.nd the 
irretrievable undoing or ruining of a voman is not the sort of thing 
languages fail to specify. Also, substituting bake for its hypernym 
cook, or~ for @ose, ~limina.tes one of the ~llllderstandings or 
'f51:"-
(21) He baked her goose.  
{22) He cooked her swan.  
--and this inconstancy of (5) under substitution supports the argument 
from implausible differentiae by poigting to an idiom in (5) 
involving the words ~ and goose .1 
Similar arguments from inconstancy of substitution are given 
by S~dock 1972 in support of the ciaims that all of the following 
are ambiguous rather than unspecified:17 
(23) That was a great idea. 
(24) You bet it's cold. 
(25) Why don't you feed the emu? 
(26) What was the name of Paul Revere's horse? 
Sadock also gives the reverse argument, that~ of 
understanding under substitution indicates lack of specification 
rather than ambiguity, 'With reference to 
(21) That was a brilliant idea. 
(understood either litere.lly or sarcastically}, in contrast to 
{23) ('With great understood either like excellent or iPm,orts.nt). 
However, the appe9.l to constancy of substitution is valid only 
insofar as ve are not prepared to countenance systematic ambiguities 
in the lexicon, There are three alternatives: (a) each positive 
evaluative adjective (brilliant. smart, clever, s;ood, intelligent 1 
~' s_nlightening, etc.) has two semantic representations associated 
with it, but these representations are related by a 'lexical 
implication rule'--a cAse vhere 'the existence of one lexical item 
implies the existence of a.nother' (Mccawley 1968:130); (b) there 
is a transformational relation between sentences with one understanding 
of (27) and those vitb the other understanding (like the transformational 
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relation that bas been asserted between the inchoEi.ti've and causative 
understandings of verbs like cool~ melt, burn, freeze, etc., as in 
G. La.koff 1970a.:32-43); or (c) there are double semantic repre-
sentations for the entire class of positive evaluative adjectives, 
vithout any statement at all in our grammat.ica.l description of 
English about the relationship betveen the two classes of semantic 
representations. For (27), a. transformational relation is unlikely, 
since there is no independent motivation for it, a.nd simply to posit 
double semantic representations leaves a generalization uncaptu:red 
by ariy principle of grammar. Consequentlyt a lexical implication 
rule {if ve are •.rilling to admit such rules) would be the only va.y 
to save the position that (27) and si~ilar examples are ambiguous 
rather than unspecified, 
Note that if there is other e~idence indicating that (27) is 
unspecified rather than a~biguous, an argument from constancy of 
substitution is good supporting evidence. Ste.nding alone, however, 
constancy of substitution merely makes a claim of lack of specification 
plausible, 
1.3. Syntactic tests. 
A number of types of tests for ambiguity use syntactic evidence. 
The assumption here is that, other things being equal, sentences 
with two distinct syYgactic structures also have twq distinct 
semantic structures. 
1.3.1. l_ntersection of patterns. 
A syntactic test closely related to inconstancy under substitution 
uses the fact that ambiguous sentences often exhibit two different 
structures~ each of •..rhich is visible in unambiguous examples. l9 This 
test has been discussed by Rockett l954 and is emphasized by Kooij 
1971. To argue that {4) is ambiguous rather than vague, 'W'e adduce 
unambiguous20 sentences like 
(~parrow}(28) They sa.v her turkey • 
her {wander}.(29) They SS.'W' 
orate 
{him}(30) They saw duck. us 
saw {his}(31) They duck.our 
(32) They sav her duck down into the cellar. 
(33) They saw her huge duck. 
Examples (28) e.nd (29) suggest that duck belongs to t'W'O different 
syntactic classes, N and V, while ( 30) and ( 31) suggest that her 
belongs to two different syntactic classes, Objective PronoWl and 
Genitive Pronoun. These differences in category are also illustrated 
in ( 32} end {33) , which can be used to argue that her duck in one 
understanding of (4) is a.n NP,. in the other an NP {her} follo..,.ed by 
a VP (duck). Taken together, these observations suggest that (4) 
represents two different surface syntactic patterns, which happen 
...... 
. . . . .~ } .. . .. .... .. .. . ... . . . . 
(by accident) to iptersect '; 
.. . .. . .. 












The claim that tvo understandings represent different patterns 
can sometimes be supported by sentences in which both patterns occur 
as parallel constructions . If these sentences are-g'ramrnatical, and 
not seliiantically redundant, they give evidence that the constructions 
are indeed different. This is the maJor line of argument21 Choms.ky 
1965:101 gives for the ambiguity of 
(36) He decided on the boat.. 
He notes that the two constl"uctioJ?,B real~zed in (36)--NP V+Particle 
NP e.nd NP VP Preposition+NP--can occur toget.her: 
(37) He decided on the boat on the boat. 
1.3,2, Special distribution, 
A test that will not vork generaJ!.ly is that or adding ma.teria.l 
to sentences to force one understBnding. · It von' t do to claim that 
(38) She wore a sweater. 
is ambiguous between undert;itand,ings i"Dcluding 'colored s\l'eater' and 
'vhite s\rea.ter 1 on the grounds that it is 1 disambigua.ted' by the 
addition of the modifier colored or white. If {38) is merely 
unspecified, the added material will supplv the necessary semantic 
content , and if {38) is ambiguous. the added material vill §~ 
the necessary semantic content. Tht).t is, the extra elements fail 
to distinguish between amgiguous and unspecified examples. 
Despite its inapplicability in general , the appeal to added 
material ('cooccurrence restrictions') is quite common in the 
literature. For instance, Sadock 1972 su)>poi-ts his claim that (24) 
is ambiguous rather than unspecified by saying that tit occurs 
untunbigUously in contexts which exelude one or the other mc~ing• 
(333)J ·citing · 
(39) You bet it's cold out you didn't say it vas. 
(40) You bet . it's cold, so why didn't you wager it. 
But if {24) is unspecified vith respect to whether it 's an expression 
of the speaker 's agreement vith a statement of the addressee's or a 
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report of a waeer, the added material in {39) and (40) would simply 
supply enough information to exclude one of these understandings; 
and if (24) is a.'nbiguous (as ind.icated by other tests}, the added 
material selects one semantic representation in each example. 
The added material tells us nothing about the status of (24), 
However, in especially fortunate circumsta.nces--when the 
distribution of the added material is restricted in ways that a.re 
not explicable on semantic grounds a.lone--this.test can give real 
evidence. 
For example, there is a well-known double understanding displayed 
by nominals such as 
{41) the shooting of the hunters 
Here hunters can be understood either as agent or patient. Notice 
that on either understanding the phrase describes an occurrence 
and can therefore appropriately take point-time adverbials. Example 
(42) the shooting of the hunters last week 
still has both understandings. Furthermore, on either understanding, 
prenominal modifiers are permitted: 
(43} the illegal shooting of the hunters 
But prenominal modifiers related to point-time adverbials succeed in 
eliminating one understanding or such phrases; 
(44} last veek 1 s shooting of the hW1ters· 
has only the understanding vhere hunters is the direct object of 
shootin~. Therefore, since the agentive understanding of (4h) is 
not ruled out on semantic grounds--that is, it is not contradictory--
some structural difference must be imputed to the source of (41) on 
the agentive understanding and its source on the patient under-
standing, so that the grammar can correctly associate the genitive 
time adverbial vith one of these and not the other. 22 
It is characteristic of good special distribution arguments 
thnt they use arbitrary features of the syntax of a language, The 
restriction on genitive time adverbials appears to be an idio-
syncracy of English. The same is true of the distribution of post-
nominal else as reviewed in Zvicky (to appear) e.nd various phenomena 
surveyed in Sadock 1972--thc obligatory absence of that in (24), 
the location of stress in (24) and (25), postposed Fse in (26), 
and expletive the heck etc. inside vb-phrases in (2 ). It is not 
necessary to have an explanation forthe special distributions of 
these items; we need only be satisfied that the distributions don't 
follov entirely from vhat the items mewi. However, since the arbitrary 
aspect of special distribution arguments is essential, there will 
often fail to be pertinent items to detect real ambiguities in a 
language. The existence of an item whose distribution is in part 
arbitrary and in pa.rt dependent upon the presence of a pa.rticulQ.I" 
element of semantic representation is a happy accident. 
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1,3,3, 	 Transformationtl potential. 
The previous two types of syntactic tests can be used by 
linguists of many persuasions. These lines of argumentation would 
be acceptable to traditional grammarians, structuralists, and 
transformationalists alike. However, they have quite restricted 
domains. Intersection-of-pattern arguments cB.n detect only those 
ambiguities that are manifested in surface syntactic differences--
immediate constituent division and membership in syntactic categories. 
Special distribution arguments can detect ambiguities with no surface 
syntactic reflexes, but only in a few lucky cases. There are more 
sensitive--and more theory-bound--tests, vhich can be extended to 
some of the ma.ny problematic examples not amenable to the other 
tests. These videly used tests call upon transformational operations 
to detect ambiguities. 
The argument goes as follows: if the semantic representations 
for certs.in sentences. le.ck specification of some piece of meaning, 
then the applicability of transformations to them cannot possibly 
depend on whether or not this piece of menning is present. If a 
sentence is unspecified with respect to some distinction, this lack 
of specification must be preserved by every transformational 
operation. But if a sentence is ambiguous, then it is possible for 
a transformation to apply in some, but not all, of the cases, so 
that the effect of the transformation is to eliminate one.or more 
Wlderstandings of the sentence. 
For instance, no transformation applied to structures containing 
the structure of (3) affects the ml.lltiple understandings of (3): 
(45) Is '!If'J' sister the Ruritani.an Secretary of State1 
(46) 	 What my sister is is the Ruritanian Secretary of 
State. 
(47) 	 My sister is the Ruritanian Secretary of State, 
isn't she? 
(48) 	 My sister, (who is) the Rurita.nian Secretarr of 
State, is a turophile. 
(49) 	 I knew my sister to be the Ruritanian Secretary 
of Ste.te. 
are all consistent with my sister's being younger or older than I 
am, with her having acceded to the post recently or long a.go, a.nd 
so on. On the other hand, the understandings of (4) are affected 
by some transformations: 
(50) Her duck was seen by them. 
(51) It was her duck that they saw. 
(52) Her duck, which they saw, had a bright green head. 
have only one of the two understandings of (4). This indicates 
that (4) is ambiguous, while (3) is unspecified. 
An argument from transformational potential requires an 
independently motivated transformation, of course, just as a special 
distribution argument requires an element vhose distribution is not 
11 
completely predictable from its meaning. It would not do to claim 
that 
(53) Susan and Matilda. talked. 
is an1biguous between a sentential conjunction understanding and a 
phrasal conjunction understanding on the grounds that the rule of 
Conjunct Movement eliminates one understa...~ding. It is true that 
(54) Susan talked with Matilda. 
has only one of the understandings of {53), But it is the very 
relationship between (53) and (54) that motivates the rule of 
Conjunct Movement in the first place. Unless there is independent 
evidence for Conjunct Movement, it cannot be used to argue for the 
ambiguity of (53). 23 
The structure of arguments from trs.nsformational potential is, 
in fact, even more complex. Consider a familiar sort of example: 
{55) We expected that the psychosemanticist would 
examine George. 
(56) We expected 	the psychosemanticist to examine George. 
The question is whether (55) is runbiguous as to vho is the object of 
our expectations, the psychosemanticist or George, or whether it is 
unspecified. Sentence (55) bas both understandings, sentence (56) 
only the former. We can conclude from these observations that 
if (i) Raising doesn't 1 change·meaning', 
a.nd if (ii} 	 the applicability of Raising depends only upon 
its input structures, or at least upon some set 
of syntnctic structures or semantic representations, 
and if (iii) 	 there is independent evidence for the transforma-
tional rule of Raising, 
then either (iv) 	 (55) has two syntactic structures, and Raising 
applies to only one of them, 
or (v) 	 (55) and (56) have. somewhat different syntactic 
structures, being related us privative opposites, 
and Raising applies only to the structure of (56}. 
Let us take these 	clauses one by one. 
First, if some transformations can 'change meaning'~ then it 
is possible that Raising is such a transformation. It might be that 
applying Raising to (55) 1 changes the focus' and yields (56}. 
Unless ve can argUe on independent grounds that Raising is not a 
meaning-changing transformation, the difference in understanding 
between (55) and (56) sheds no light on the ambiguity issue, In 
theories the.t prohibit meaning-changing transformations, the 
understa.'ldings of (55) e.nd (56) must 'bear on this issue, subject 
to the follo'Wing que.lification. 
Second, if the applicability of some. transformations depends 
upon material not in semantic or syntactic structUl"es--if, for 
instancet the applicability of some transformations depends upon 
purely pragmatic considerations--then it is possible that Raising 
is such a. transf'ormation. · It might be that the a.pplicability of 
Reising to (55} depends upon who the speaker of (55) has in mind. 
Unless we can argue on independent grounds that Raising is not 
dependent on p~agmatic considerations, the difference in under-
standing between (55) and (56) sheds no light on the ambiguity 
issue. In theories that prohibit pragmatically conditioned trans-
formations, the widerstandings of (55) and (56) must bear on this 
issue, subject to the previous qualification. 
It follows that in relatively unconstrained syntactic theories--
those allowing meaning-changing transformations or pragmatically 
conditioned transformations--it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to a.pply at1biguity tests using transformational potentinl. In fa.ct, 
theories permitting pragmatically conditioned transformations also 
make difficult the tests from intersection of patterns and special 
distribution, since in such theories pragmatic considerations might 
have influences at any level of grammar. Since we are treating 
normal argumentation, in vhfch transformational potential is taken 
to be significant, ve continue this discussion by assuming a 
constrained syntactic theory, 
Third, it must be established on independent grounds that 
there is a rule of Raising. If there is no evidence for Raising, 
or if a.r~ents for Raising are based entirely up~n the relation 
in understanding between (55) and (56). then facts involving 
Raising don't lead to any clear result about the ambiguity of (55). 
If all the precedin~ conditions are satisfied, we are still entitled 
only to one of tvo conclusions: either that {55) is nmbigUous by 
virtue of having two distinct syntactic structures, or that (55) 
has a somewhat simpler syntactic structure tha.n (56}, the difference 
in structure being the element that conditions Raising for (56). 
For if Raising cantt be demonstrated to map the structure of (55) 
into the structure of (56), or if the only evidence that Raising 
performs this mapping comes from the realtion between (55} and (56), 
then (again) facts in•1olving Raising don.'t lead to any clear result 
about the e.mbigUity of (55). We can posit different structures for 
(55} and (56), parallel to current analyses of interrogatives, 
negatives, imperatives, passives, and the like. 
Arguments for ambiguity then depend very much on arguments for 
the form of transformational rules, Well-established rules like 
m-Question Movement provide an excellent basis for transformational 
potential arguments. Rules like Passive and Raising are less 
useful, because the exam.ples we are most interested in a.re just 
those that are crucial in deciding the form of the rules. 
A few words on arguing for lack of specification by means of 
transformational potential: such arguments e.re ex silentio; 
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to claim that a particular example.is unspecified; on the basis 
of transformational potential~ is only to claim that we know of 
no transformations that eliminate one of the understandings of 
the example (as in the discussion of (3) earlier in this section). 
Arguing in this vay is suggestive, though not (of c9urse) decisive. 
We nov turn to a.n especially interesting subclass of trans-
formational potential tests. 
1.3.4. Identity tests. 
These use certain rules that refer to identity of constituents--
pronominalization and deletion rules requiring identitv of~~ 
(rather than identity of reference). The utility of Conjunction 
Reduction for this purpose has been recognized in generative grrunmar 
since Syntactic Structures, where this rule was used to determine 
the boundaries and the category of a constituent (Chomsky 1957:35-6). 
Roughly, to be eligible for reduction, two conjoined clauses must 
be of the forms X - A - Y a.nd X - B - Y~ vhere A and Bare consti-
tuents of the sume type, This condition on A and B can be used to 
support arguments distinguishing ambiguity and lack of specification, 
as in the ca.se of {4). If (4) is ambiguous, then her duck in one 
understanding is not of the srune type as her duck in the other; one 
is an NP composed of Det plus N, the other is composed of the two 
constituents NP and VP (recall (34) and (35)). The sentence 
(57) They snv her swallov. 
has the same two understandings. It follows that Conjunction 
Reduction should be possible only when (4) and (57) have :matching 
understandings; 
(58) They saw her duck and (her) swallow. 
should have tvo understandings, not four--which is correct. The two 
non-matching, or crossed, understandings, are excluded by the 
condition that A and B be of the same type. 
With respect to the material X and Y which must be identical, 
Conjunction Reduction provides an even more stringent test. I£ 
(59) Morton tossed down his lunch. 
were unspecified, rather than ambiguous, as to whether Morton 
bolted his lunch or threw it to the ground, then the parallel example 
(60) Oliver tossed down his lunch. 
would also be unspecified, and the reduced sentence 
(61) Morton and Oliver tossed down their lunches. 
would have four understandings, not tvo, because the identity 
condi~ion on Conjunction Reduction can~t require identity of elements 
that aren't part of eyntactic structure. But (61) lacks the crossed 
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understandings {except as a Joke}, and we conclude that (59) is 
ambiguous. To support our intuition that (61) lacks the crossed 
understa.ndirigs, we can add contextual information so as to favor 
different understandings in the tvo predicates: 
{62) ?Morton, as al.rays a greed..v eater, and Oliver, 
~ho continued to refuse food on principle, 
tossed do~n their lunches. 
Contrast the long-standing versus recent understandings of (3), 
~hich are paralleled in 
(63) My sister is a. prominent composer, 
but which are not eliminated by the identity condition on 
Conjunction Reduction: 
(64} My sister is the Ruritanian Secretary of State 
and a prominent composer, 
has all four understandings, as ve can see by appending contextual 
infor~.ation rorcing different understandings in the two predicates: 
(65) 	 My sister is the Ru.rite.ni8.Il Secretary of Sta.te, 
and has been for years, and a prominent composer, 
thanks to her Concerto for Bassoon and Tympani 
that was published last week. 
If (64) lacked the crossed understandings, (65) would be anomalous. 
Other deletion-upon-identity transformations give the same 
results. The sentences 
(66) She called Jane a cab, 
(67) He called Jane a dog-ca.rt. 
each have two understandings, and the result of Gapping--
(68) She called Jane a cab, and he a dog-cart. 
--still bas only tvo (again excluding obvious jokes), Similarly, 
VP Deletion, as in 
(69) I vouldn 1t call her a cab, but George might, 
excludes the crossed understandings. 
G. Lak.off 1970b has increased the stock of rule tests by 
reference to identity transformations that yield pro-forms, in 
particular a rule that gives!£, as in 
(70) I called her a cab~ e.nd so did George, 




(71) I called her a cab, but George wouldn't do so. 
and some rule or rules generating the same (thins)--
(72) 	 Margaret abhors Melvin's cooking, and the same 
(thing) goes for Selma ana Sherman. 
{73) 	 Yesterday my best friend vas denounced as a 
Bloomfieldian counterrevolutionary~ and today 
the same (thing) happened to me. 
{74} 	 This morning my sister sold her self-portrait, 
and this afternoon I did the same (thing), 
It is important to note that the identity tests support the other 
tests, in the sense that they never predict lack of specification 
when other tests predict e..mbiguity. In certain instances the 
identity tests seem more stringent than other tests; these are 
treated in section 2.3 and the appendix. We continue our discussion 
of the identity tests in section 2.1 belov. 
l.~. Pra@:tic tests. 
A limitation on the use of the identity tests for ambiguity 
arises from the possibility that some crossed understandings are 
excluded by virtue of pragmatic, rather than semantic, considerations. 
Let us consider an example in some detail. 
Heinamiki 1s recent treatment of before clauses like the one in 
(75) John shut up before Harry got mad at him. 
tries 1to shov that the context determines which one--the before-
olause or its negation--is under$tood to be a valid inference' 
(Heina:ma.ki 1972:140), vithout taking a stand on whether the tvo 
understandings of {75} are distinct in semantic representation. An 
identity test seem.a to indicate ambiguity: 
(76) 	 John shut up before Harry got inad at him, and 
so did Chuck. 
doesn't allow the crossed understandings (in vhich Harry didn 1t 
get mad at John but did at Chuck, or the reverse} • However J as 
Richmond Thomason has pointed out to us, it might be the case that 
there is only- one before in semantic structure, and that this before 
is usable in two different classes of contexts, being rougnly 
paraphrasable by s.nd then in one class of contexts, by and so •••not 
in the other. Thomason also points out that there is a testable 
difference between the pragmatic account and the semantic one: in 
the pragmatic account, the crossed understruidings should be absent 
in the unreduced sentences.24 The question is then whether sentences 
like = 
(77) 	 Mary shut up before Bill left, and Jane shut up 
before Harry got angry; :Sill left, and Harr:, 
didn't get angry. 
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are anomalous or not. Our mm Judgment in this case is that (77) 
is no more anomalous than sentences like 
(78) 	 Julia declined a cocktail, and then Iris declined 
an irregular verb. 
{79) 	 Stan croaked Clike a frog], and then Ollie croaked 
(died] .25 
which have two homophones, differently understood, in close proximity. 
Presumably the difficulty in obtaining the crossed understandings in 
such cases has to do with psychological set and not with differences 
in contextual conditions; this vie~ is supported by the fact that 
the anomaly of examples like (78) and (79) can be alleviated by 
supplying a previous discourse favoring the crossed understandings, 
e.g., for {79): 
{80) Stan has often amused us with his imitations of 
animals. Unfortunately, Ollie had both a weak 
heart and a violent rear of frogs and toads. 
Stan croaked, and then Ollie croaked. 
The same is true of (77): 
(Bl) Bill announced that he was about to leave, and Harry 
said that hetd be furious if Jane didn't shut 
up. Macy shut up before Bill left, and Jane 
$hut up before Rarey got angry; Bill left • and 
Harry didn't get angry. 
We cannot conclude that there are no cases for which a pragmatic 
account of non-crossing is correct--only that (76) seems to re~uire 
a semantic account. 
One way in ~hich pragmatic considerations certainly do eliminate 
crossed understandings is in the application of transformations 
requiring identity of reference, as Conjunction Reduction does for 
definite NPs. Both (3) and (63) can be understood as referring to 
a younger sister or an older sister; the reduced conjunction (64) 
does not allow an understanding in which a younger sister is the 
Ruritanian Secretary of State and an older sister a prominent 
composer, or the reverse. Non-crossing here follows from the fact 
that Conjunction Reduction requires identity of reference for the 
two occurrences of my sister. The pragmatic reflex of this requirement 
is that the two occurrences of nv si,ster must be understood a.s 
referring to the same person in every context in which (64) is 
appropriate; consequently, the two occurrences cannot have different 
properties. 
2. Identity tests for ambiguity. 
2.l. Introductory remarks. 
In the recent literature (following G. La.koff 1970b) identity 
tests have been much used to decide cases for which other tests for 
17 
ambiguity are inapplicable or unclear. 26 , 27 Thus Lawler 1972:250 
argues from ~dentity tests that · ·· · · 
(82) Ken drives a trµck, 
is a.mbigum,l.B, not vague 1 betveen a. habitual and an occupational 
reading, while Green 1972:92 argues that 
{83) Miranda hammered .a coo.thanger. 
is vague, not a.mbiguousy with respect to whether the resultant state 
is flatness or straightness. 
There are still other cases where the identity tests bear on 
the truth of some unobvious claims. For instance, Dahl 1972 
maintains that sentences like 
(84) Bill loves his wife, and so does He.rry. 
are not ambiguous between an understanding in which Harry loves his 
own vife and one in which he loves Bill's wife (as all other 1<rriters 
on the subject have assumed). liovever, the position that (84) is 
unspecified i~ not verified by identity tes'l;s: 
(85) 	 Bill loves his wife, and so does Harry, and the 
same thing goes for Sam and Mike. 
has several understandings, but not one in which Harry loves Bill's 
wife while Sam and Mike each love their ovn, nor one in which Bill 
and Harry each love their own wives while Mike loves Sam1 s. These 
crossed understandings should be possible if (84) were unspecified. 
There are other cases where application of identity tests yields 
no significant results. Lakoff and Peters 1969 analyze both 
(86) John and Martha left. 
(87) John and Martha are married. 
as ambiguous bet~een· sentential conjunction and phrasal conjunction, 
the latter corresponding to sentences like 
(88) John left (together) vith Martha. 
(89) John is married to Martha.. 
respectively. David Dowty, Larry Martin, and Carlota Smith have 
suggested to us that identity tests indicate that (86} is unspecified 
Md (87) ambiguous: 
(90) John and Martha left, and so did Dick and Pat. 
(91) John and Martha are ma.rried, and so are Dick and Pat. 
According to them, (90) allovs the crossed understandings, (91) does not. 
But it seems to us that the crossed understandings are available 
for (~1) as vell, since anyone who is married is married to someone. 
Similarly, it is not surprising that (90) can h&ve crossed under-
standings, since anyone vho has left together with someone has left~ 
and the faet that someone has left does not exclude the possibility 
that he left together vith som~one. We are dealing here vith 
privative oppositions, so that no matter .what the linguistic state 
of affairs, by applying identity tests we vill always conclude that 
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ve are dealing with a lack: of specif"icaUon; the e~iste·nce oJ the 
less specific understanding guarantees that we wil get al~ possiQle understandings. 
The snme is true of other cases of. privative. oppositions. 
Consider the sentence 
( 92) I saw a dog, and so did Harold. 
as a relevant datum bearing on the putative ambiguity of 
(93) I saw a dog, 
Now (92) is to be derived by an identity-of-sense transformation 
from. 
(94) I saw a dog, and Harold sav a ~og, 
which has four understandings in which the uhrase. a do~ is understood 
to be nonspeci~ic:28 
(95) I sa., ~ dog, and Harold saw UNDERSTAMDI.NG #~~+MALE +MALE l +MALE no gender indicated 2 no gender indicated +MALE 3 no gender in<icated no gender indicated 4 
The identity-of-sense condition on!£. should eliminate understandings 
2 and 3. But how can ve tel? Even if we have strong intuitions 
about what (92) and (94) sav, how could ~e elucidate these intuitions to someone who doesn ' t share them, ~r is puzzled about them? No appeal to contexts vil help, because every context in which the 
crossed understandings (2 e.nd 3) are· appropriate is also a. context 
in vhich the paralel understanding 4 is approP,riate. Therefore, ve 
can't test the possible understandi:ri.gs of (92)--or (94)., for that 
ms.ter--by supplying a context that forces one ot the crossed under-
standings , as ve did in the discussion of (61)-(62) and (75)-(76); i"f 
ve eliminate the paralel understandings' ve also eliminate'. the 
crossed understandings. . 
Yet another example involves verbs that may be understood factively, but are not necessarily so understood (Kiparsky and 
Kiparsky 1970:163). If SOl!leone hypothesizes that a sentence like 
(96) The police reported that the culprit had fled. 
has a factive understanding ~nd an understanding with no commitment as t<> !activity, we cannot use i~entity tests to support or to 
atack the hn>othesis; the. factive understanding implies the other. 
In fact, ambiguiti·es involving privative opposi't;es wil be 
ext.remely difficult to argue for vi.th M,X syntac:.tic test. Interse~tion-
of-patern arguments wil be very bard to come by, since ~e vil need 
not only a diagnostic element ~ith a distribution that is syntacticaly constrained in part, but also one constrained semanticaly t o occur 
only with items having the more general understanding; a restriction 
t o occurrence with the more specific understanding woul d not be 
detectable, since any sentence with the more specific understanding 
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is consistent with the more general understanding. Thus, in the 
case of dog we would. need an element constrained to occur only 
vith nouns whose gender is not indicated (person, lion, friend~ 
neighbor, and the like) and nouns with one semantic representation 
in which gender is not indicated (dog, 8£lOSe, duck~ and so on)~ 
and constrained syntactically in addition. Much the sa.me is true 
for transformational potential tests other than those using identity 
of sense: we would need a transformation whose applicability 
depended upon the occurrence of the more general understanding, 
hence which applied only to structures that lacked indication of 
the value of some semantic feature. It isn't clear that there are 
any such transformations, or even that these are any diagnostic 
elements with the required sort of distributional restriction. 
In contrast, a very promising area for the applicntion of 
identity tests is that of illocutions and perlocutions. For the 
purposes of the following discussion, ve vill use the term ~J,l~qg 
to refer to those speech-act types that are distinguished in the 
semantic representations of a particular language. It follovs that 
one of the ways in vhich languages can differ is in their sets of 
illocutions, and this seems to be so. For any particular language~ 
our task is to decide what its illocutions are and how they are 
realized in terms of linguistic form, Some illocutions will have 
forms unique to them, like the English reduced sentences that are 
unwnbiguously suggestions: 29 · 
(97) Why not move to Chicago? 
(98) Ho~ about giving yourself a treat? 
Much more commonly, however, the surface forms of different 
illocutions will coincide in pa.rt, and we are confronted with the 
problem of deciding which sentences are illocutionarily ambiguous 
and in what vays. This problem is made more difficult by the fact 
that a given sentence will have many different Wlderstandings~ as 
far as its possible uses are concerned, but that only some of these 
require representation in semantic structure. Those uses which do 
not require representation ve term l?erlogfil~S..·30 We now turn to 
an exwnination of the properties of perlocutions with respect to 
identity tests. 
2.2. The unexceptional uerlocutions. 
We wouldn't expect identity tests to be sensitive to perlocutions, 
since these effects (or the intention of the speaker to accomplish 
them) a.re not part of the semantic representations of sentences. 
In most cases this expectation is fulfilled. Suppose, for exa.m.ple, 
that the assertion tha.t Bill dated Martha vould surprise a.n addressee 
in some circumstances. Then in these circumstances. the same 
addressee would be surprised by any of the following sentences: 
(99) Bill dated Martha and so did Harry. 
(100) Harry dated Martha and so did Bill. 
(101} Bill and Harry da.ted Martha. 
(102) Harry a.nd Bill dated Martha. 
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(103) Bill dated Martha and Harry Cynthia, 
(104) Harry dated Cynthia. and Bill Martha. 
Notice in particular that the surprisingness of' the e.ssertion that 
Bill dated Martha is entirely independent of whether or not the 
other conjwict is surprising. That is, the crossed understandings 
are available regardless of what reduction rules have applied. 
Observe also that a speaker might intend either one, or both, or 
neither of the underlying conjuncts in ~he sentences above to be 
surprising, so that the crossed understandings having to do with 
the speaker's intentions are available as well, 
Many other typical perlocutions share this behavior. Thus, 
either of the conjuncts in (99)-(104) can be intended to niislead 
and could succeed in misleading. In a suitable context any conjunct 
in (99)-(104) could amaze, please, offend, or hurt the addressee, 
make the speak.er seem petty, forthright or.ridiculous. In all of 
these cases the reduction tests give believable results: sentences 
are not many-vays ambiguous as to perlocutionary intent or effect; 
they are unspecified. 
2,3, The exceptional perlocutions. 
In isolation, a.ny strong assertion is open to both a literal 
and a sarcastic understanding; the stronger the assertion, the more 
plausible the sarcasm. Thus 
(105) Grobman is a real genius. 
can be used to convey something on the order of 
(106) Grobman is a complete idiot. 
No~ consider the folloving sentences: 
(107) Grobman is a real genius, a.nd so is Chomsky •. 
(108) Grobrnan and Chomsky are real geniuses. 
(109) 	 Grobman is a real genius and Verhalt an absolute 
prince. 
(110) 	 Grobman and Verhalt are a genius and a prince, 
respectively. 
The second conjunct in (107) and (108) has been chosen so that the 
sarcastic understanding is far-fetched. The result is that the 
first conjunct cannot be understood sarcastically either. In (109) 
and (110), where we have no special prejudices which could influence 
the underste.nding, the conjuncts may be literal or sarcastic. But 
both must be literal or both sarcastic; the crossed understandings 
do not exist. According to the identity tests, then, we must adjudge 
the difference between u literal and a sarcastic understanding as an 
ambigUity. This result it tantamount to the problematic claim 
that the nowi genius (and all similar lexical items) is ambiguous 
bet~een an wtderstanding 'exceptionally intelligent individual' 
and an understanding 'exceptionally stupid individual'; compare the 
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disc.ussion of brilliant in section 1.2 .3. 
Let us consider metaph.or next .. 
(111) Irving has jumped into a pit of alligators. 
could be used to signify something on the order of the literal 
sense of 
(112) 	 Irving has embarked on a dangerous course of 
action. 
Now with this metaphorical interpretation, notice that only a 
parallel metaphorical understanding is available for the second 
underlying conjunct in any of the following sentences: 
(113) Irving has Jumped into a pit of alligators and 
so ha.s Gebhardt. 
(114) Irving has jumped into n pit of alligators a.nd 
Gebhardt has too. 
(115) Irving o.nd Gebhardt have Jumped into a pit of 
alligators. 
Thus the reduction test informs us that the metaphorical sense of 
the first conjunct is one pole of Ei.n B.IDbiguity. But there is no 
obvious bound on the number of metaphorical uses of a given sentence, 
so the identity tests tells us that every potentially metaphorical 
sentence is infinitely a.mbiguous.31 
. Similarly, the folloving sentence cannot.be taken as a non-
lit'era.l insult followed by a serious assertion: 
(116) 	 Your father drives a semi and so does your 
brother Mark. 
Nor is there any understanding of 
(117) 	 The Polish Academy of Sciences just announced the 
first successful appendix transplant and so 
did the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. 
in which the first conjunct is a joke vhile the second is a state-
ment of fact. 
(118) 	 ?There are about a million students in my 
introductory class and about a half million 
people in Greater Winnipeg, 
is likewise odd unless the first conjunct expresses a reasonable 
estimate of the size of the class. And finally, 
{119) ?Alfred eats like a horse and so do zebras. 
can only be ta.ken as indicating tha.t Alfred is a grazing animal or 
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something of the kind. These examples illustra~e that ins'Ults, 
jokes, exaggerations, and similes work like metaphor in limiting 
the understandinB of subsequent reduced conjuncts. 
Several of these perlocutions share an additional behavior 
with respect to the identity tests, a behavior that makes it 
certain that the tests need revamping: if the first conjunct is 
understood literally, a second reduced conjunct may be understood 
nonliterally. That is, for several of these perlocutions, an 
identity test yields neither the straightforva.rd result that the 
difference in understanding is an ambiguity (tvo understandings)~ 
nor that it is a lack of specit'ication (four understandings). 
Instead, there are three understandings. To see that this is so~ 
consider again example (116). This sentence can certainly be 
understood as a serious asse~tion of the beliefs or as a double 
insult. In the latter case it could be felicitously uttered when 
the speaker does not believe that either person in fact drives a 
semi. As has already been :pointed out, ( 116} doesn't have an 
understanding in 'Which the first conjunct is nonlitera.l but the 
second conjunct is literal, But if the speaker of (116) believes 
that the addressee's father does indeed driven truck and that the 
addressee knows he be1ieves this, he cou1d ~ell intend the second 
conjunct to be understood nonliterally as an insult. The first 
conjunct, the literal one, would serve to so:rten the addressee up 
for the blow of the second, nonliteral, conjunct. 
One totally unacceptable interpretation of the fact that some 
reduced sentences have three understandings would involve the claim 
that the range of ambiguity of underlying clauses is partially 
dependent on vhether they a.re first or second conjuncts. Such a 
conclusion could be acc0Illll1odated in a. generative grammar only by 
means of a novel sort of semantic vell-formedness constraint. 
2.4. An interpretation of the facts. 
It is clear first of all that there is a property shnred by 
all of the anomalous perlocutions which distinguishes them from the 
perlocutions that behave in the expected manner. The anomalous 
perlocutions involve a suspension of a funds.mental principle of 
conversation: the sincerity principle (Grice's super.maxim of 
quality: 'Try to make your contribution one that is true'). Joking, 
irony, sarcasm, metaphor, simile, and nonliteral insults all involve 
the speaker's saying something he does not literally mee.n.32 
Furthermore, the speaker wants the addressee to req~ that he 
is not speaking sincerely. In contrast, the unexceptional 
perlocutions either require no suspension of the sincerity principle 
(as in pleasing, shocking, offending, etc.) or else involve the 
speaker's concealment of a suspension (as in misleading, lying, 
some flattering~ etc.). 
The fact that the speaker wants the addressee to recognize his 
insincerity can help to explain vhy the anomalous perlocutions can 
be signalled nonlinguistically by vinks~ jabs in the ribs, and so 
on. There is also a tendency for these perlocutions to become 
partially conventiona1ized in the forms of the langu_age--that is, 
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for them to become illocutions. Thus a dia.1.ect of American English 
which employs nasa:J.ization to indicate sarcasm has been reportad.33 
Similarly, it is possible to mark an utterance as a Joke by puttin~ 
on a W. C, Fields or Groucho Marx-accent. In English and Russian, 4 
l iteral comparisons can be distinguished from simil~s . 
(120) He eats l ike a bear does. 
(121) On jest kak medved 1 • 
can only 	be literal, whereas 
(122) He ea.ts like a. bear. 
(123) On jest medvedem. 
can also be exaggerated similes, Of course vhen these intentions 
become codified, the original effect is vea.kened or lost. A Joke 
is better if told ~ith a straight face, and sarcasm is more biting 
if the pretense of seriousness is maintained. Hence there is also 
a tendency for differences between the literal and nonliteral i~ten-
tions to disappear . 1fote that there is no form in English or Russian 
that signals that an utterance is to be taken ~s a nonliteral simile. 
How obs.erve that the va.ys of understanding (103)-(105) are just 
those available for . the WE$..<!~ sentence 
(124) 	 Irving has jUlllped into a pit of alligators, and 
Gebhardt has Jumped into a pit of alligators. 
The same is true for examples ilIVolving the other exceptional 
perlocutions. In each case, the absence of one crossed reading is 
a pragmatic phenomenon, not a semantic one; recall the earlier 
discussion ( section l.b) of Thoma.son's suggestion. That is, identity 
tests for ambiguity are irrelevant for cases like (103)-(105), But 
vhy should the anomalous perlocutions--those involving the suspension 
of the sincerity condition and an intent on the part of the speaker 
that this suspension be recognized--fail to have one crossed under-
standing in examples like (12q)? 
A plausible line of explanation is the folloving. Once a 
conversational principle has been violated, the hearer bas no vay 
of telling when the rule will be back in force and tends to assume 
that the violation will continue for some time. Thus, the violation 
persists through some stretch of discourse. For certain conversational 
principles, those concerni ng politeness , for instance, the span of 
violation is considerabl e. Once a spea.ker bas failed to 'keep his 
distance', he cannot easily resume a polite stance. Consequently, 
once he haa asked a personal question, it is strange for him to use 
the fonuula if you don't mind my askin~ to introduce another personal 
question; he has already been presumptuous: 
(125) A, Hov much did th&t dress cost? 
B. Twenty dollars. 
A. 	 ?If you don't mind my asking, vhere did you 
buy it? 
Hote that the same questions , but vith the formula first, e.re in no 
way odd: 
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(126) 	 A. If you don't mind my asking, how much did 
that dress cost? 
B. Twe,nty dollars. 
A. Where did you buy it? 
The same 	persistence effect explains vhy the unreduced exwnple 
(12q) lacks the crossed understanding metaphor-literal statement, 
and why 
(127) 	 There are about a million people in San Antonio 
and there are about a million people in m,.v 
introductory class. 
lacks the crossed understanding hyperbole-literal statement, and why 
(128) 	?There are about a million people in my 
introductory class and there are about a 
million people in San Antonio. 
is odd. 
The anomalous perlocutions, then, do not provide true exceptions 
to the identity tests for ambiguity; their properties seem to follow 
from their nature and from the pragmatic considerations sketched 
above. 
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Appendix. Intentionality and i4entity tests. 
The problem of intentional versus nonintentional understandings 
of sentences like 
(129) John cut his arm with a knife. 
(130) John hit the wall. 
(131) Bruce stumbled coming down the stairs. 
is considered by G. Lakoff 1970b, who argues for an ambigUity by 




John cut his arm with a knife and so did Harcy. 
John hit the wall and so did Harry. 




said by Lakoff to lack both crossed understandings. He cites 
language, Cupeno, that appears to distinguish intentional from 
nonintentional Wldersta.ndings by morphological means, thus offering 
the defense that the differentia between the understandings of (129) 
~(131) is not implausible (compare the discussion in section 1.2.1). 
Lakoff I s conclusion has been a·is:puted by Catlin a.nd Catlin 1972. 
There are several difficulties in these discussions, First, 
there is some terminological confusion; the term.s ,!Jlj;,,.~_t.J,._q,:g~\ {versus 
ppn~,!ltsn,iJ..91¥!.J.. or ynjn:tentional), voliti,Q,.l,lJY-, (versus nonvolitio11~1), 
and purposive or purposeful (versus nonpurpgsive or ~ccident&kJ 
have been used by one writer or another. But these vords do not mean 
quite the same thing in English, and it is not clear which of them, 
if any, correctly describes the difference between the understandings 
of (129)-(131)'. 
Second~ it is hard to tell hov the negative terms !U"e to be 
understood: do they indicate polar oppositions or privative 
oppositions7 Both Lakoff and the Catlins seem to take the former 
position, but vithout any argument on the point. Note that in the 
latter position the identity tests would be inapplicable, as ve 
pointed out in section 2.1. 
Third, it is not obvious that the differences in understanding 
exhibited by (129)-(131) are a matter of intention alone. Sentence 
{130), for example, might be claimed to exhibit two different under-
standings of the subject (John versus John's bodv), a difference 
in agentivity, a difference in the sense of hit~ or a difference in 
deleted adverbials (with his fiat versus withhia body, or either of 
these versus no adverbial element in semantic structure). Sentence 
(130} might, in fact, have more than two readings in semantic 
structure. One possibility, based on analyses in Dovty 1972:ch. 5. 
is that (130) has three semantic representations35__intentiona1 
agentive, nonintentional agentive, a.nd nonagentive. In the intentional 
agentive understanding~ John intends to hit the wall and accomplishes 
this; in the nonintentional agentive understanding, John intends to 
act, but doesn't necessarily intend to hit the vall; in the non-
agentive understanding, John doesn't necessarily intend to a.ct. Note 
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that tqe 	distinction bet.ween intentional ,md nonintentfonal agentives, 
a.s well as the dist::.nct:l.on bet-ween and nonngentives, is a. 
privative rathe.t· thrj.t1 1~. polar c,ppCJsitior:i, so that identity tests 
will not be 
Fourth, different s:riea}~e::-s give sor:tewbat diffe:rent judgments 
on the wayn in whfoh ae1'!.t;;.mc:es lite ( )-{ 131) can be un.derstood. 
Catlin and Catlin cJa.:;:n tha.t the two understandings of (129}, like 
those of ( 130) c·one to two d i.f'ferent p:-1ysical acts, 
'John's nickiog his ,,irm while peeling ve:::"$Us gouging his 
a.rm to the bone 1 ( ) • Ou.r own reel is tbat tr:.e difference in 
the actions doesn't correlate a;t. all with intent ionall ty, that (129) 
has all four understandings. 
Furthermore·, on reduc:t:ions .with :-.he Catlins disagree 
directly with L&koff. who c le.irr:s that ) 1 cu.n i!.wolve two pur-
poseful, or two a.ce:iiic:;:,trc.l, cut,t.i.ng::i. B:.,t (132) ce.nnot mean that 
John accidentally nick0d his n.;:m (while ulicing potatoes) and Harry 
purposefully Glnshec:l a•za.y at his, nor the reverse 1 ( 359). The 
Catlins sa.y that in (132}, Harry 1 5.n a 11articularly vfolent episode 
of sleep-walking ca", have non·tc,lit,i one.il.y .••cut hi. s anr, with a 
knife! in a manner.i:mfficiently nimila:- to ,John';; us.rallel intentional 
actions that the con.Jimctibn vi.th + Aux is perf~ctly acceptable' 
{507}. The q1.1aet ion is then sent,ences like 
(135) 	?John, intended to commit suicide> cut his arm 
with e. knife,. and so did Harry, ,rho accidentally 
ran into a bread knife ~·tile sleepwalking. 
are tieculie.r beca.u.so tr,ey involve e.n internal self-contradiction. 
Our own a.cce:pta.b.ility ,judgment on (135) is that it merits at 
best a question mark. L~of':f' should :re,iect it, the Ca.tlins accept 
it, given thei:r respee tiYe positions on ( 132) . Our opinion -~f the 
at.her crmrned underst.1:;.11c1ing is the $.rune: 
(136) 	 ?Jobi. 2.::::cid.entally running into e. bread knife 
\rhi1e sleepwalking, cut his arm with a knife, 
and sc did Harry, who tl"ied to commit suicide. 
is quite 	pecul:i.a:r. 
Fifth, different identity tests give different results, Identity 
tests using deletion appear to be more stringent than those using 
1!2. and =-=.::..., since the crossed understandings of 
(137) John and Harr:'{ {both; c:trt their arms. 
(138) John cut his arm, and ne.!"ry his 
are quite im~ossiblc for us. 
Sixth, different examples have different properties. Example 
(129), for which both crossed understandings a.re peculiar, contrasts 
vith (131). -We agree vith the Catlins that (1~4-) may report a. 
situa.tion in vhich 'orucc may 1ie.Ye drlli,k too m1.J.ch to :make his way 
down a fl!ght of' stairs without mishap. Herb wants to demonstrate 
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how clumsy Bruce looked coming do.m the stairs a.nd.:reneats Bruce's 
performance, this time stumbling on purpose' ( 506) • Th~s ! 
(139) 	 Bruce, the drunken oaf, stumbled coming dovn 
the stairs, and so did Herb, -.rho -was cruelly. 
making fun of Bruce, 
isn't odd, But the other crossed understanding is much more 
difficult: 
(140) 	 ?Bruce, illustrating how he portrayed a drunk 
on stage, stumbled coming do'lm the stairs, 
and so did Herb, who vas so interested in the 
demonstration that he vasntt looking where 
he \ras going. 
is sOtI1evhat odd. 
The difference between (129) and (131) can be accounted for 
if (as David Do'Wty has suggested to us) stumble on pur:e,ose is 
treated as a nonliteral phrase. If the meaning of stumble 
specifically involves lack of intention, then stumble on purpose 
ought to be n much odder phrase than cut on pur~ose~ and using it 
should require some extension of the literal sense of stumble. 
Certainly it is odder. Its nonliteral character is indicated by 
the oddness of the unreduced sentence corresponding to (140): 
(141) 	 ?Brucet illustrating how he portrayed a drunk on 
staget stu.~bled coming down the stairs, and 
Herb, who vas so interested in the demonstration 
that he wasn't looking where he \ms going, 
stumbled coming dovn the stairs. 
That is, saying strnble on purpose is a sort of temporary redefinition 
of st\llllble; this temporary redefinition sbovs the same properties 
as the other exceptionai perlocutions discussed in section 2.3, 
The difference betveen deletion rules and pro-formation rules 
is genera.! and has a plausible explanation. Consider the exceptional 
perlocutions of section 2.3--hyperbole, for instance. The unreduced 
sentence 
(142) 	 Astorville has about a million people in it, 
and Penntow has about a million people in it. 
can be understood as tvo literal statements, tvo exaggerations, or 
a literal statement folloved by a.n exaggeration. A pro-formation 
rule applied to (142) yields a surface sentence vith tvo VPs and 
having the same three understandings as (142): 
(143) 	 Astorville has about a million people in it, 
and so does Penntown. 
A deletion rule applied to (143), hovever, yields a surface sentence 
vith only one VP: 
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{144) Astorville and Penntovn (each) have about e 
million people in them. 
To obtain the crossed understandings, a hearer must perceive a 
single occurrence of the VP have about a million people in it as 
both literal and nonliteral, which is, of course, d fficult. rhis 
perceptual difficulty occurs in (137) and (138) as vell. 
The difference betvcen speakers is he.rder to account for. 
Perhaps different speakers have somewhat different sets of semantic 
interpretations; such variation has been attested for other 
constructions in English. However, this difficulty is overshadoved 
by the problem of determining exactly vhat the readings of (129) and 
(130) are for any particul~r speaker. If the suggestion above is 
correct for {130), there are rnore interpretations than Lakoff and 
the Catlins give, and identity tests will shed no lip,ht on the 
subject. In any event, the discussion by Le..~off a.nd the Catlins is 
quite inconclusive~ and neY sources of syntactic evidence are needed 
to decide the issues. 
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1. Most of what follows applies equally to underlying (or deep) 
syntactic representation and to semantic representation. Consequently, 
the discussion below uses only one terni, semantic r r se~;sn, 
(also known as semantic s~ructure, (semantic .inl;erpreta.tion.
(semantic) reAQing, sema.nM1c d~scriptiop, 1ogica..1 renresentation, 
lp&ig§l tQrm., logice..l struc;twe, sense and mea.ninir by various writers). 
When a distinction might be impo~tant, there is brief discussion in 
a. note. 
2. The term atnbiguity is used here pJ!ll in this sense. For 
a survey of the variety of applications or the ter~s ~ and 
~, see Binnick 1970, 
3. For thP. distinction, compare the discussion of ambiguity 
in Katz 1972: 59.-63, in response to Weinreich. 
4. The follorlng discussion uses the term~ 
throughout. 
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5. This useful example is due to Dennis Stampe, with the 
collaboration of Thomas Patton. 
6. S.ections 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.3, and 2.1 are based upon section 
2 of Zwicky (to appear). · 
7, To argue for a difference in semantic representations is 
also to argue for a difference in underlying syntactic representa-
tions, in some (but not all) theories of grammar. If it is possible 
for a single underlying syntactic representation to correspond to 
two or more semantic representations, by virtue of rules relating 
the former to the latter, then an argument for a difference in 
semantic representations will not necessarily count as an argument 
for a difference in underlying syntactic representations. There 
I
might, for instance, be a rule saying that every und~rlying syntactic 
representation of type X corresponds to semantic repr,esentations of 
types X' and X". In theories that countenance such i)nterpretive 
rules, only syntactic tests are truly decisive. 
8. Jt'rom here on the count noun understanding as e. neutral term 
to cover both those elements of 'meaning' (in a broad sense} that 
get coded in semantic representations and those that !do not. Each 
understanding corresponds to a class of contexts in ~hich a linguistic 
expression is appropriate-- though, of course, a class of contexts 
might correspond to several understandings, as in examples like 
Someone is renting the house (courtesy of Jerry Morga:n). 
9, The assumption referred to here is the substance principle,  
discussed in Zwicky 1971,  
10. There is more to be said here. A particular syste~atic 
lack of specification might involve the product of several distinctions 
of course (right-handed younger sister vs. left-ha.nd~d older sister 
in (3)~ for instance). Also, the reference to 'simp~e 1 distinctions 
presumes at least a rough classification, on the par~ of linguists, 
of the universe of meaning distinctions. • 
11. Plausibility of.' lack of specification is tr,eated by 
Richman 1959 as the sole (and rather unsatisfactory) !criterion of 
ambigUity: : 
The dispute over [a general termJ T's ambiguity 1arises 
presumably because that T denotes can be divited into 
tvo (or more) classes, a a.nd S, vith defining character-
tstics ~and~ respectively. The question of the ambiguity 
of T turns on the question of whether or not a and Bare 
sub-classes of a larger class, or of whether~ ~nd whave 
some characteristic in common, The obvious ansWier that a 
and S are sub-sets of aVa, or that qi and tJ, shar:e the 
characteristic 1 4>V¥J I is not intuitively satisfac'tory. The 
question is this, a.re qi and iµ suf'f'iciently alike
1 
(in some 
unspecifiable Ya.y)? If they nre, Tis unambiguous, if 
not , not. (9lf. ) 
12. For ease of exposition here~ ve ma.ke the simplifying  
assumption that understandings can be compared by meruis of binary  
semantic re~tures.  
13. 'Privative Oppositionen sind solche, bei denen das eine  
Oppositionsglied durch das Vorhandensein, das a.ndere durch das  




14. Some speakers '-<ill have difficulty in accepting (ll·) t 
because of the repetition Qf the word dog with two different 
meanings. Compare the discussion of psychologicai set in section 
1.4. 
15. The question murk (here and. throughout tllis paper} 
indicates an anomaly other than ungrammaticality, in pal"ticular 
internal contradiction or inappropria~eness. 
16. I111plausible differentiae and inconsto.ncy of substitution 
are the methods used by Alston 1971:3-8-42 to distinguish different 
senses of ~- Alston's treatment in~ludes a nice discussion of 
the way in vhich these arguments depe·nd upon a systematic development 
of the semantics of a language. e.nd o~ how they can nevertheless 
be used (provisi~nally) in the absence of. a fully developed semantics. 
17. Thus, That was an excellent idea ha.sonly one of the 
understandings of (23) , You wagered it's cold only one of the under-
standings of (24), nnd How come you don't feed the emu? only one 
of the understandings of (25). The mnbigui ty of T261 is supported 
by reference to other sentences with interrogative form, so~e of 
vhich ha•1e paraphrases lacking one of the u."'lderstandings of (26} 
(true question vs, 'requestion '}: Is it ra.ining (please)?, Do you 
suppose it's ra~!!.,ing (*please)7 
18. Compare Leech 1970:269--
Many ambiguities will oonifest themselves in sepnra.te 
deep grammar representations for the same formal item. 
The question of vhnt ambiguities should be distinguished 
in deep gre.remar is largely a. question or the 0 ecottomics11 
of the total langungc description . •• All ve assert by means 
of Cour definition of ambiguity ns the 'condition of 
one formal item satisfying more than one semantic 
description' {29)J is that they have to be distinguished 
in semantics. 
19. Weinreich 1966: 4o4 remarks that 
The typical. examples of syntactic e.mbiguity are of a 
1bi:!'ocal. 1 kind, e.g. The statistician studies the whole 
year or lie left his car with his: girl friend. That is 
to say, if an insufficiently delicate subcatego~ization , 




He v rlP 
- I r~--
studied Determiner Quant N 
I l I 
~ ~ year 
delicacy at vhich the runbiguity vere to be exhibited, 
two interconnected r evisions vou.ld have to be made: 
Verbs would have to be divided into transitive and 
intransiti~re, o.nd HPs vould correspondingly have to 
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be divided into objects, dominated by VP, are adverb-
like Temporals, The great rarity of uni~ocal 
a.111biguities in grammar~-even in languages •..rith very 
poor morphology ..• --is itself an interesting comment 
on the design of language. However} unifocel syntactic 
ambiguities do ~xist, as do bifocal semantic ones,lcl 
r'ootnote 18 cites She threw a ba.11 a.nd He arran~ed the music. 
20. Unambiguous in the relevant respect. (28} is still 
ambiguous, since it can be used to report habitual acts of sawing 
birds, and (37) can also describe the (rather unlikely) escorting 
of a duck into a cellar. 
21. He also gives a.n argument from transformational :potential 
{section 1,3,3), based on the fact that the µhrase on the boat 
can be preposed only on one understanding of (36). 
22. It may well turn out that the facts surrounding the 
distribution of prenominal genitive adverbials deserve a trans-
forniational account. The restriction may turn out to be one on 
a rule of grammar which produces the genitives from adverbial 
source structures. But from the point of view of methodology--which 
is the main concern of this paper--simply the distribution of these 
adverbials relative to understnndings can be used in sound arguments 
for the existence of syntactic ambiguity, without commitment to any 
specific analysis of the relevant phenomena. 
23, The discussion of phrasal conjunction in La.koff and Peters 
1969 uses Conjunct Movement in ._1 ust this 'Jay. 
24. A similar point is made by Dieterich 1973. 
25. This sentence must be read with full stress on the second 
occurrence of croaked. Destressing repeated occurrences of a 
lexical item is itself an identity-of-sense transformation. 
26, We discuss La.koff 9 s cases and the response to them by 
Catlin and Catlin 1972 in nn appendix; the phenomena are much more 
complex than would appear from this exchange. 
27. An interesting question which will not be pursued here 
is~ identity tests work as vell as they do in distinguishing 
ambiguity. There is no obvious reason why at least some reductions 
could not take place blindly and subsequent to the falling together 
of two source structures, In such cases, the tests would feil to 
reveal genuine ambiguities. 
28, For ease of exposition we disregard the specific under-
standings of (92}-(94). 
29. These examples are to be rend without contrastive or 
emphatic stress. The main stress in (97) falls on Chicago, in (98) 
on treat. With stress on not and about, respectively, the examples 
a.re both anibiguous between suggestion and question. 
30. We adopt this terminology as the simplest for our purpo:.es 
here. In Sadock ms., following L. J. Cohen and others, perlocution 
is used as a general term encompassing illocutions. 
31, There is a way out of this trap. It could be claimed 
that the ambiguity the identity test leads us to postulate between 
a literal and a metaphorical intent does not involve the specific 
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interpretation of the metaphor in question but only the fact 
that the sentence is to be ta.ken metaphorically. That is7"one 
might claim that one of the literal senses of example (111) is 
accurately captured by a paraphrase such as Metaphorically speaking, 
Irving has jumped into a pit of alligators. · 
3~. Compare Austin 1961:45~~ 
'When we make an assertion such as 'There is a goldfinch 
in the garden I or I He is angry' , there is a sense in 
which we imply that we are sure of it or know it 
( 'But I took it you knew', said reproachfully), though 
what we imply, in a similar sense and more strictly, 
is only that we believe it. 
Searle 1969:57 treats sincerity as one of the 'normal input and 
output conditions' on utterances. 
33, By P.. Lak.off in oral presentations. 
34. For English see Morgan 1972. The Russian examples were 
pointed out to us by Willirun Daniels. 
35, Dovty 1s arguments do not carry over directly to (130), 
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